The Supreme Court, consisting of Justices M.R. Shah and C.T. Ravikumar, has given a ruling stating that a dispute between defendants regarding the validity of a sale deed cannot be considered in a suit for possession initiated by the plaintiff. The plaintiff had filed the suit for possession based on a registered sale deed executed in their favor. However, the defendants had an inter-se dispute on the validity of the sale deed that was executed between them with regard to the land in question.
The Supreme Court stated that the adjudication of a right or claim by way of a counter-claim made by one defendant against their co-defendant could not be allowed under Order VIII Rule 6A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The rule specifies that a defendant in a civil suit can make a counter-claim against the plaintiff, but cannot make a claim against a co-defendant.
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The Court held that the dispute between the defendants regarding the validity of the sale deed was not relevant to the plaintiff’s suit for possession. The plaintiff had based their case on the registered sale deed executed in their favor and the dispute between the defendants did not have any bearing on the validity of that deed.
The ruling implies that disputes between defendants on the validity of a sale deed cannot be considered in a suit for possession filed by the plaintiff. The ruling is significant as it clarifies the scope of Order VIII Rule 6A of the CPC and its applicability in such cases. The ruling also emphasizes the importance of maintaining the legal procedure for adjudication of disputes and the significance of adhering to the rules of civil procedure.
The Bombay High Court’s ruling on the validity of a sale deed executed between co-defendants regarding the suit property has been overturned by the Supreme Court.
The High Court had declared the sale deed void under Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, and as a result, the sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff was also held to be void.
However, the Supreme Court has now set aside the High Court’s order and ruled that the sale deed was not void under Section 9(1) of the Act. The Court held that the Act only applies to agricultural land and not to non-agricultural land, and since the suit property was non-agricultural land, the Act did not apply.
The Supreme Court’s ruling implies that the sale deed executed between the co-defendants is valid, and consequently, the sale deed executed in favor of the plaintiff is also valid. The decision is significant as it clarifies the scope of Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, and emphasizes the importance of carefully analyzing the provisions of the law before applying them.
The ruling also emphasizes the significance of adhering to the principles of natural justice and ensuring that all parties have a fair opportunity to present their case. The Supreme Court’s decision to set aside the High Court’s order ensures that justice is served in the matter and highlights the importance of following the correct legal procedures.
The Supreme Court bench observed that both the Trial Court and the High Court had failed to consider the statutory bar of jurisdiction contained under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, while entertaining the contentions raised in respect of the Act. Section 36A of the Act bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the Act, which means that the Civil Court cannot entertain a suit that falls within the purview of the Act.
The Court also noted that the defendant’s written statement only contained a vague reference to the Fragmentation Act and did not provide sufficient information to be treated as a counterclaim capable of being treated as a plaint. The Court stated that a counterclaim must be capable of being treated as a plaint, and since the defendant’s written statement did not meet this requirement, it could not enable the court to pronounce a final judgment on the issue.
The Supreme Court’s observation emphasizes the importance of following the correct legal procedures and ensuring that all parties have a fair opportunity to present their case. The Court noted that the Trial Court and the High Court had failed to consider the statutory bar of jurisdiction contained in the Fragmentation Act, which had resulted in an incorrect decision. The Court’s decision highlights the significance of carefully analyzing the provisions of the law before applying them and ensuring that all relevant facts are taken into account while making a judgment.
The ruling also emphasizes the importance of clearly articulating legal claims and counterclaims in pleadings. The Supreme Court noted that the defendant’s written statement did not meet the requirements of a counterclaim capable of being treated as a plaint, which had resulted in an incorrect decision by the lower courts. The Court’s decision underscores the significance of adhering to the principles of natural justice and ensuring that all parties have a fair opportunity to present their case in court.
The bench further observed that the Trial Court and the High Court had not taken into consideration the statutory bar of jurisdiction contained under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, while entertaining the contentions raised in respect of the Fragmentation Act. It also held that the vague averment made in the written statement of the defendant could not be treated as a counterclaim capable of being treated as a plaint.
Damodhar Narayan Sawale filed a lawsuit to gain possession of a piece of land that was sold to him by Ramakrishna Ganpat Mhaske and Tejra Bajirao Mhaske, who were the first and second defendants in the case, respectively. The sale was carried out through a registered deed in 1979. In 1978, Ramakrishna acquired title over a portion of the land from Tejra through another registered deed, while Tejra retained ownership and possession of the remaining portion. Ramakrishna supported the plaintiff’s claim and arguments by submitting a written statement.
The High Court had earlier held the sale deeds executed by the defendants as void in view of Section 9(1) of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947.
The sale deed between the defendants and the plaintiff was declared void, leading to its cancellation. However, the Supreme Court bench pointed out that the High Court did not take into account the legal implications of the registered sale deeds, which were considered by the First Appellate Court when it overturned the High Court’s decision and ruling.
The bench noted that the sale deeds were registered and admitted by the defendant and held that the High Court did not take into account the legal implications of the registered sale deeds. It observed that the First Appellate Court had considered the legal implications of the sale deeds and reversed the judgment of the High Court.
In its written statement, the 2nd defendant, Tejra, claimed that the sale deeds executed in favour of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant were not genuine and were executed only as collateral security to a money-lending transaction. It also argued that the transaction was in violation of Section 8 of the Fragmentation Act. The Trial Court dismissed the plaintiff’s suit, finding that the sale deed was indeed a sham document and was executed only as security for a loan.
However, the First Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court’s decision, stating that Tejra had failed to prove that the sale was a result of a money-lending transaction and that the sale deed was merely nominal in nature. The First Appellate Court therefore decreed the plaintiff’s suit for possession of the land based on his title. Tejra then appealed to the Bombay High Court, which reversed the First Appellate Court’s decision and restored the Trial Court’s dismissal of the suit.
The Supreme Court, in a Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the decision of the High Court, observed that while the powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India must be used sparingly, there is nothing in the said Article that prohibits the Supreme Court from reversing concurrent findings of fact by lower courts if it is of the opinion that affirming the lower court’s findings would result in a grave miscarriage of justice based on the evidence on record.
The court noted that both defendants had admitted the execution and registration of the sale deed in favor of the plaintiff, although the 2nd defendant claimed that it was executed as collateral security for a money lending transaction. The 2nd defendant also admitted the execution of a registered sale deed in favor of defendant No. 1 in respect of a portion of the suit land, which was executed before the sale to the plaintiff.
According to the Supreme Court’s analysis of the case, the Trial Court had held the sale deed executed in favor of the 1st defendant as invalid by accepting the argument that the transaction violated Section 8 of the Fragmentation Act. The court held that the sale deed, executed in 1978 between the defendants, created a ‘fragment’ and therefore contravened the prohibition contained in Section 8.
However, the court observed that Section 9 (1) of the Fragmentation Act voids only transfers or partitions of land that are contrary to the provisions of the Act. The purpose of the Act is not to completely prohibit the transfer of land within any notified ‘local area’, but to prevent the fragmentation of agricultural holdings and to facilitate the consolidation of such holdings for better cultivation.
The court pointed out that a careful reading of Section 36A and 36B of the Fragmentation Act reveals that when a civil suit is filed, the court must determine whether it involves any issue(s) that require resolution by a competent authority under the Act. The court observed that both the trial court and the High Court failed to consider this requirement. The bench added that the court’s jurisdiction must be determined based on the allegations made in the plaint, and not solely on uncorroborated statements in the written statement.
The Supreme Court of India noted in a recent case that the Trial Court had deemed the sale deed executed in 1978 between the 1st and 2nd defendants to be practically void, as it accepted the argument that the transaction contravened Section 8 of the Fragmentation Act. The court held that the sale deed created a ‘fragment’ and violated the prohibition contained in Section 8.
The court pointed out that Section 9(1) of the Fragmentation Act declares null and void only those transfers or partitions of land that go against the provisions of the Act. Additionally, the court remarked that the Fragmentation Act aims to prevent the division of agricultural lands and promote the amalgamation of agricultural holdings to enhance cultivation.
The bench ruled that the Trial Court and the High Court failed to take into account the legal impediment to jurisdiction imposed by Section 36A of the Fragmentation Act while addressing the contentions raised concerning the Act. The court noted that when a lawsuit is initiated in a Civil Court, the court must assess whether the case involves any matter(s) that must be settled, determined, or handled by a competent authority under the said Act.
The bench maintained that the court’s jurisdiction must be ascertained based on the claims made in the plaint and not solely on the uncorroborated claims put forth in the written statement. The written statement submitted by the 2nd defendant merely included a vague statement regarding the Fragmentation Act, which could not be interpreted as a counter-claim that could be treated like a plaint and governed by the rules that apply to plaints under Order VIII Rule 6 A, CPC.
The court held that no counter-claim, within the meaning of Order VIII Rule 6A, CPC, was made by the second defendant, and no averment whatsoever was made specifically in the written statement filed by him. The court asked how such an issue as to whether ‘he had proved to be a marginal owner’ in the light of the Fragmentation Act arose for consideration.
The bench held that the plea was not available to the defendant since, as per the first proviso to Section 9(3) of the Fragmentation Act, the automatic voidness would not be attracted to a transfer of land contrary to the provisions of the Fragmentation Act if it was made on or after 15th November 1965 and before the date of commencement of the Maharashtra Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act, 2017.
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